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PUBLISHED DECISIONS 2000
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Appeal from decision of Zoning Board of Review. The trial justice affirmed the decision of the Zoning Board denying a special use permit and relief from dimensional regulations. The Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that dimensional relief could only be granted in conjunction with, not in addition to, a Special Use Permit. State of Rhode Island v. Ronald L.'Heureux, No. 90-0883 Remand from Supreme Court for determination of factual issues regarding discovery. The trial justice rejected defendant’s claim that state improperly withheld exculpatory information contained in police report, ruling that defendant knew of the information because he had filed the report himself. John T. Sheehan v. Nunes Realty, LTD. and Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, No. 95-0208 Motion for summary judgment. The trial justice granted defendant realty company’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff realtor was not properly licensed to sell real estate at the time of sale; consequently, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s eligibility to sell real estate. Motion for partial summary judgment. The trial justice granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on two counts in plaintiff’s complaint in irrevocable trust suit. First, the trial justice found no merit in plaintiff’s assertion that defendant trustee should be removed as trustee because defendant did not abuse his discretion in that capacity. Second, the court declined to issue declaratory judgment naming plaintiff as primary beneficiary of trust because such judgment would have contradicted the express terms of the trust. Consequently, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to either count. Bess Eaton Donut Flour Company, Inc. v. Zoning Board Of Review Of The Town Of Westerly, No. 99-0209 Appeal from decision of Westerly Zoning Board of Review. The trial court affirmed the decision of the Board denying a special use permit for a drive-through window and bake shop at Bess Eaton Donuts. The trial justice found that the Board’s chairman did not substitute his judgment for that of the drafters of the Ordinance because he properly addressed the criteria set forth in the Ordinance for determining whether a special use permit should be granted. The Court also found that the dissenting members of the Board did not abuse their discretion because they made proper findings of fact to support their decision denying the permit. State of Rhode Island v. David ST. Laurent, No. 95-0562 Remand from Supreme Court for hearing on motion for a new trial. The trial justice denied defendant’s motion for a new trial because defendant did not make requisite showing that newly discovered evidence said to be exculpatory to his case was withheld by the prosecution. Specifically, defendant did not show that the alleged exculpatory evidence was (1) newly discovered since trial, (2) not merely cumulative or impeaching, but material to the issue, (3) of the type that would change the verdict at a new trial, and (4) diligently sought by the defense in discovery at the time of the original trial. Motion for attorneys’ fees. The trial justice granted plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees in suit filed to enforce provisions of the Rhode Island Open Meetings Act. Because the Open Meetings Act was enacted prior to the grant of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (though subsequent to the filing of the complaint), the Court applied the law in effect at the time final judgment was rendered. Motion for new trial. The hearing justice denied motions for new trial filed by defendants Edward D. DiPrete and Patricia DiPrete because the trial court did not commit manifest errors of law in denying various motions regarding revocation of former Governor’s state pension. The hearing justice also found that because defendant had agreed to allow the Retirement Board to hold his $42,066.70 contribution to the state pension plan pending appeal, defendant was entitled to post-judgment interest pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-21-10. Plaintiff’s oral proof of claim. The hearing justice awarded plaintiff $41,350 in special medical expenses stemming from car accident. State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations v. Melodina Cedano and Ramon Melendez, No. 99-569 Motion to suppress consent to search form. The trial justice denied defendant’s motion to suppress a consent to search form signed by her in the presence of investigating police officers, ruling that officers did not coerce or intimidate defendant and that defendant had no difficulty understanding what she was signing despite the fact that she was foreign-born and does not speak fluent English. Appeal from decision of South Kingstown Zoning Board of Review. The trial justice affirmed the Board’s decision upholding the Notice of Violation issued by building inspector for engaging in non-customary home occupation. The trial justice concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that lawnmower repair and sales did not constitute a customary home occupation. Amended complaint seeking monetary damages from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management for alleged temporary inverse condemnation of real property. The trial justice found that plaintiff does not have standing to bring a Fifth Amendment claim for temporary inverse condemnation of real property because plaintiff acquired ownership rights to the property after the alleged taking occurred. Instead, the owner at the time of the alleged taking was the proper party to challenge the constitutionality of the taking. Adrien J. Godin, Jr. v. Bristol Industrial Park, Inc., et al, No. 95-6210 Cross-claim seeking indemnification and attorney’s fees in negligence action. The trial justice found that cross-claim plaintiff Bristol Industrial Park is entitled to indemnification and attorneys’ fees from cross-claim defendant East Bay Rubber pursuant to express terms of lease between Bristol and East Bay. Paul Gencarelli v. Warwick Zoning Board of Review, No. 98-0953 Appeal from decision of Warwick Zoning Board of Review. The trial justice found that the Zoning Board’s decision denying special use permit and dimensional variances was not reviewable because the Board failed to apply relevant legal principles to its findings of fact. The trial justice remanded the case back to the Zoning Board for proper adjudication featuring closer examination of evidence presented in the original hearing and application of relevant legal principles to those facts. Matthew Lewiss v. R.I. Ethics Commission, No. 97-1209 Appeal from decision of the Rhode Island Ethics Commission. The trial justice reversed the decision of the Commission fining appellant $15,000 for failing to recuse himself from various Fire District Meetings at which matters involving a contract between the Fire District and one of appellant’s former clients were discussed. The decision was reversed because the Commission did not issue a final probable cause determination within the 180-day period required by G.L. 1956 § 36-14-12 (c). Shirley Prisco Hoard et al v. Kenneth Walker et al, No. 98-1750 Appeal from decision of East Providence Zoning Board granting a use variance. The trial justice found that Board’s decision was clearly erroneous because evidence shows that structure owned by appellee could have yielded a beneficial use despite restrictive provisions of zoning ordinance. As such, G.L. 1956 § 19-45(b)(1) is satisfied and the Board’s decision granting the variance is reversed. Petition for writ of mandamus and motion for summary judgment. The trial justice denied plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus ordering the City of Providence to pay his pension and grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiff is entitled to pension benefits. In granting summary judgment for defendants, the trial justice found that plaintiff’s purchase of additional service credit violated § 17-125 of the Providence Code of Ordinances; accordingly, plaintiff could not meet his burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact existed for trial. Similarly, plaintiff’s petition for a writ of mandamus was denied because the trial justice was powerless to compel a result to which plaintiff does not have a legal right. David O. Thompson v. Colonel William E. Defeo and the City of Warwick, No. 98-0730 Appeal from a decision of the Hearing Committee convened under the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights. The trial justice affirmed the decision of the Committee because it was not clearly erroneous in view of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record and the Committee had competent evidence before it to sustain charges of improper collection of evidence; under such circumstances, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Committee. Town of Middletown v. Lee Wehrley, No. 98-281A Motion to dismiss complaint filed by the Town of Middletown for violation of § 94.31 of the Middletown Code of Ordinances regulating the horseback riding on town beaches. The trial justice denied defendant’s motion to dismiss because the Town of Middletown is authorized to regulate the right of passage along the shore for the purpose of preserving and protecting said shore and the enjoyment of the people. The court rejected defendant’s claims that Middletown lacked jurisdiction to restrict access to the shore and that such restrictions violated Article I §17 of the Rhode Island Constitution. Complaint filed by the Department of Environmental Management against private corporation claiming ownership and control of the Pascoag Reservoir Upper Dam. The trial justice ruled that state’s claims of adverse possession, easement by prescription, riparian rights, and dedication of the lake by the Corporation for public purposes were without merit because the state was unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has ever acquired any right, title, or interest in the lake which would supercede the legal title held by the corporation. Therefore, the corporation is entitled to prohibit public access to the lake despite decades of permitting public use. The plaintiff filed an action for a declaratory judgment to determine whether Russell was entitled to the protections of G.L. 1956 § 36-5-7 (1956), and if so, whether plaintiff or the defendant Rhode Island Department of Administration (DOA) was responsible for providing Russell with employment. The Court held that Russell was entitled to veteran's status and that as a result of this status he was entitled to be retained in state service in a position of similar grade to the one he previously held. The DOA had the duty of placing him in that position when and if it became available. The plaintiff, a licensed retail beverage and food business, appealed from a decision of the defendant, the acting liquor control administrator in the department of business regulation of the State of Rhode Island and the board of license commissioners of the Town of Smithfield. The decision required plaintiff to renew a license issued under G.L. 1956 § 3-1-1. The license allowed him to have a kitchen separate from the bar area in his business as required by R.I. Code R. 02-050-001, Reg. 7, 28. The decision was affirmed. The plaintiff did not have a property right as a prior licensee to not comply with the duly adopted regulations. Further, the plaintiff was not denied due process. Leo H. Tellier v. Employees Retirement System of Rhode Island, No. 99-1023 (April 11, 2000) Appeal from a decision of Retirement Board. The board held that appellant was not eligible for a pension. The retirement of a municipal employee is not covered by the APA, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-18(b)(21). The board’s decision was affirmed and the appellant was not entitled to retirement benefits pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-21-16 because he had not accumulated ten years of contributing service time. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s motion was granted and the defendant’s motion was denied. The Court held that it was neither supported by legal authority, nor equitable, to strip the plaintiffs condominium owners of a right to parking spaces that they had been using for twelve years. The ratification of the agreement made by the parties was clear. Summary Judgment. The plaintiff tenant sought to reduce its share of expenses associated with maintenance of a parking lot and for compensation of expenses incurred in purchasing equipment promised to it by defendant. Summary judgment was granted to plaintiff on both its claims. The defendant was renting out parking spaces promised to plaintiff as part of its lease, and failed to provide equipment promised to plaintiff. Robert Gallagher v. State of Rhode Island, No. 95-0705 (April 14, 2000) The plaintiff filed a claim for damages pursuant to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, G.L. 1956 § 12-25-1 et seq., claiming he was entitled to compensation for injuries he sustained in a fight with intervenor. The Court granted dismissal because plaintiff failed to meet his burden to prove that the injuries were a result of a criminal assault. Administrative appeal in employment discrimination matter. The issue on appeal pertained to the parties’ rights to demand a jury trial. While these appeals were pending, the state legislature framed a cure for the constitutional infirmity in the remedial scheme provided in the Fair Employment Practices Act. However, 1999 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 496, § 2, provided the amendment would not affect the right of any party in a case already pending. Either party was permitted to demand a jury trial on the plaintiff's complaint of employment discrimination. The defendant employer was not entitled to dismissal of the complaint. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Narragansett Zoning and Platting Board of Review, No. 99-0069 Appeal from a decision of the Town of Narragansett Zoning and Platting Board of Review. The Board upheld a building inspector's revocation of a building permit granted to appellant to construct a pole sign. The Court affirmed because the Board's decision was not clearly erroneous and the Board did not act outside its authority in requiring that all modifications to the site plan be presented to the Board. A national automobile insurer issued a policy to one insured in Rhode Island and to another in Louisiana. Both insureds were involved in accidents, and both challenged the insurer’s position that it was only liable for the costs of repairing their cars, not for diminished value. The court applied the laws of the forums in which the respective contracts were formed, Rhode Island and Louisiana, and held that under the law of both states, but more clearly in Louisiana, the contract of insurance was ambiguous, creating a question of fact that required trial. Although the insureds also sought relief under a theory of unjust enrichment, the court held that they could not recover under that theory in either jurisdiction, because they had an express contract with the insurer. Limited liability company (LLC) member filed a motion for the court to direct the receiver of defendant LLC co-member to accept an offer to purchase defendant's membership interest in the LLC and to declare the parties’ rights with respect to that interest. Ordered that pursuant to the reconstitution agreement, upon the dissociation of defendant LLC co-member, the LLC was to purchase defendant's membership interest in the LLC, valued according to defendant's share of the LLC’s net worth. Appeal from Warwick Zoning Board of Review brought by plaintiffs. The defendants were granted a height variance allowing them to build a home higher than permitted by ordinance. The plaintiffs were adjoining landowners of the waterfront property. The zoning board’s decision was affirmed as the Court found substantial evidence in the record and the decision was not clearly erroneous. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to restrain defendant from denying plaintiffs use of defendant's parking lot for tenant and patron parking and for ingress and egress to public streets. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and dissolved the temporary restraining order outstanding in this matter, since plaintiffs' use appeared to be a use by permission, and plaintiffs would still have access from their property to a public street without the easement. R.I. Public Telecommunications Authority v. Glenn F. Russell, et al, No. 93-7116 (May 2, 2000) Action for declaratory judgment. Amended decision. Michael Volpe v. Lisa Riccio, Alias, No. 96-0227 (May 3, 2000) Plaintiff contends that defendant returned a different ring, one of lesser quality and value. Plaintiff contends that shortly prior to ending the engagement, defendant went to Angelo Lauro of Bellini Jewelers to have a substitute, look-alike ring made. Both plaintiff witnesses were credible. Defendant Riccio was not credible at all. Nothing about her version of events rings true. Plaintiff has proven his claim clearly and convincingly. Judgment for plaintiff for $ 8,000.00. Appellants applied for a special use permit to operate a museum to be located on appellant corporation's land, and run by appellant foundation. The land was residentially zoned, but museums were permitted upon issuance of a special use permit. Appellee Zoning Board of Review denied the permit, and appellants sought review. The court found that appellee's dictum that a museum could not share a building with a private residence was unsupported by the zoning ordinance. Appellee's finding that the museum would not be maintained by a tax-exempt entity was contradicted by the record. Its finding of appellant's noncompliance with the ordinance's parking plan was not based on the evidence, and it failed to strictly construe the ordinance section applicable to parking, but it applied the ordinance to interfere with appellant's beneficial use of the property. Plaintiffs moved for oral proof of claim to enforce judgments which had been entered entitling them to damages representing the difference between full salary and benefits as if presently employed and never retired, and what they had actually received after being incapacitated in the line of duty as police officers. Defendants moved to modify or vacate the judgments. The court found that plaintiffs were entitled to the salary or wage and benefits to which they would have been entitled had they not been incapacitated, and directed plaintiffs' counsel to prepare orders consistent with figures to which the parties had previously stipulated upon such a finding being entered. Robert Bailey, et al v. Algonquin Gas Transmission, 96-3304 (May 9, 2000) Defendant moved to vacate default judgments against it in a suit was brought by a number of individual plaintiffs who alleged that they were injured as a result of exposure to certain chemicals while working on a pipeline project. The court denied the motion to vacate the default judgments, because defendant's attorney's failure to respond to discovery demands resulted from unexplained or willful neglect of his responsibilities, not excusable neglect. Plaintiffs sought a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain defendant from denying plaintiffs use of defendant's motor vehicle parking lot for tenant and patron parking and for ingress and egress between plaintiffs' property and public streets. Defendants urged the court to dissolve the temporary restraining order and to deny plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction denied; temporary restraining order dissolved; plaintiffs' use of defendant's property was permissive and pursuant to an agreement; thus, plaintiff was not entitled to an easement to use defendant's motor vehicle parking lot for parking and for ingress and egress between plaintiffs' property and public streets William B. Faulkner v. Joseph L. DiNobile, Jr. and Charlene DiNobile, No. 96-188 (May 10, 2000) Petitioner filed for enforcement of a mechanic's lien for services and materials he expended building a home for respondents. Respondents counterclaimed that petitioner's work was defective, that they were fraudulently induced to contract with petitioner, and that they were forced to spend large sums to rectify petitioner's substandard work. The court found that petitioner was entitled to prevail on his mechanics lien, but left other issues for resolution in a breach of contract action. Burke-Tarr Company v. Ferland Corporation, No. 88-296 (May 16, 2000) Remand from Supreme Court. After re-trial on issue of whether servient estate was diminuated in value due to noise and traffic congestion from furniture store, trial justice found that plaintiff servient estate was damaged in the amount of $50,500. Action to recover costs of suit and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-32-2(d) (the “Anti-SLAPP” statute). The trial justice awards costs and attorney’s fees and dismisses defendant’s argument challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Dr. Gary Block and Dr. Justine Johnson v. Vetcor of Warwick, LLC, No. 99-0970 (May 19, 2000) Request for declaratory relief. The trial justice denied plaintiff’s request to declare a non-competition covenant contained in an employment contract invalid. The geographical and durational limitations of the covenant were found to be reasonable. The plaintiff contested the validity of a signed release and settlement agreement for previously completed legal (tax) work. The trial justice found the release to be unambiguous on its face and therefore enforceable. Motion to remand to Zoning Board of Review for consideration of additional evidence pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-69(b). Motion denied. The trial justice found the additional evidence would not be “material” and no “good reason” existed to remand the case as is statutorily required. Appeal from decision of Zoning Board. Appeal denied. The trial justice found plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied to their detriment on the issuance of an entertainment license while operating an adult entertainment business and therefore equity does not lie. Appeal from Zoning Board of Review. The Board granted a dimensional use variance to defendant thereby decreasing the “buffer zone” between plaintiff’s and defendant’s property lines. Appeal denied. The trial justice determined that the Board’s decisions were not clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and that this was the “least relief necessary.” Thomas Matthews v. State of Rhode Island, No. 98-0580 (May 30, 2000) Petition for Post-Conviction relief and Motion to Correct Sentence denied. The trial justice found that the petitioner could not rely on a clerical mistake (wrong date entered on docket) to prove a guilty plea was not “knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” Robert Girard v. State of Rhode Island, No. 98-0269 (June 1, 2000) Motion for summary disposition after request for post-conviction relief and motion to vacate conviction. Motion denied. The trial justice applied the doctrine of laches since the defendant sought relief nearly 18 years after his initial plea of “nolo contendere.” Appeal from Zoning Board of Review sitting as the Platting Board of Review. The trial justice remanded the decision since the Board did not set forth its factual determinations and because the record contained no evidence that public notice was given pursuant to the Cranston Subdivision and Land Development Regulations Section XI B(2). Motion for relief from final judgment pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The trial justice held that the court lacked jurisdiction, according to Rule 11 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, to act on said motion for reconsideration because the appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court. Karen Ann Defruscio v. Ceclia Defruscio, No. 99-1652 (June 8, 2000) The estate of decedent and the named beneficiary of a life insurance contract both filed a direct claim to the proceeds. The trial justice found the terms of a stockholder agreement were not enforceable due to the happening of a satisfied condition subsequent and the named beneficiary was entitled to the insurance proceeds. Motion for expedited hearing pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-2-19. The trial justice granted the motion in this medical malpractice action and dismissed defendant’s argument that section 9-2-19 is unconstitutional. Trial justice denied plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 59 finding that reasonable minds could differ on the issue of liability because many versions of the accident events existed. Anthony Boscia v. Rocco DiIorio, No. 97-2390 (June 21, 2000) Trial justice granted plaintiffs request for contribution in connection with the payment of a promissory note where the plaintiff and defendant partners were jointly and severally liable. Appeal from a decision of the Zoning Board of Review. The trial justice found that the Zoning Board had competent evidence in order to grant a dimensional variance and that the “more than an inconvenience” standard had been satisfied. Appeal from an order of the Chief Judge revoking appellant’s constable license. The trial justice determined that the court lacked jurisdiction because the Administrative Procedures Act defines “agency” to expressly exclude “the legislature or the courts” and the appeal was taken from the District Court. Appeal from a decision of the Zoning Board of Review. The trial justice upheld the Board’s decision to deny a request for a special use permit and found that the Board acted properly in analyzing the application under the old regulations while looking to the purposes of the newly enacted zoning ordinance. Doris Green v. John Russo, No. 96-4811 (July 17, 2000) Action to recover costs pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 34-7-7 and G.L. 1956 § 42-12-2. The trial justice ordered defendant to pay plaintiff “full costs,” including aerial map and expert surveyor since these costs were necessary to protect plaintiffs’ right to undeveloped real property from claims of adverse possession. Complaint for declaratory judgment and administrative appeal from a residency determination made by the Rhode Island Commissioner of Education. The trial justice dismissed the action for declaratory judgment because any potential uncertainty concerning the commissioner’s interpretation of the term “resides” within the context of G.L. 1956 § 16-46-1 was resolved. The decision was affirmed as it was supported by reliable and probative evidence. Court appointed liquidator petitioned the Court for instructions and declaratory relief in proceedings under G.L. 1956 § 27-14.3-1 et. seq. The trial justice determined that a movable generator was property of the liquidation estate and therefore not a fixture. The court found that its removal and ultimate sale would not cause substantial injury to the property in question. Appeal from decision of Zoning Board of Review. The court vacated and set aside the decision of the board of appeal and the planning board denying a proposed subdivision plan. The court found that the plaintiff did not receive a fair opportunity to be heard before its application was denied on grounds not reasonably raised during the administrative review process. Christine Reilly et al v. David Kerzer, M.D., et al, No. 99-4098 (August 10, 2000) Motion to strike defendant’s affirmative defense. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s affirmative defense, which relied upon all benefits, rights and protection pursuant to G.L. § 9-19-34 (the so called collateral source rule), as unconstitutional. Request for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The court issued a permanent injunction precluding defendants from seeking arbitration with respect to alleged breach of contract by the state. Motion to dismiss pursuant to Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing under the Rhode Island Antitrust Act and with comparable federal antitrust statutes. Appeal from the decision of the Zoning Board of Review. The court found that competent evidence existed to support the board’s finding that it would be acting in excess of its authority if it allowed a house to be constructed on an unimproved street. The defendant moved for summary judgment and plaintiff moved to amend its complaint. The court granted the motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff for failing to state material issues of fact indicating deprivation of civil and constitutional rights. Furthermore, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend, because it would result in prejudice to the defendant. Richard C. Wilkinson v. The State Crime Laboratory Commission, et al, No. 94-1035 (August 29, 2000) Motion for summary judgment having been granted, the court was left to decide plaintiff’s claim for civil contempt and the defendant’s counterclaim for reimbursement. The plaintiff’s claim for contempt was dismissed for failing to come forth with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant violated or failed to comply with a temporary restraining order. The defendant’s counterclaim for reimbursement was also denied.
Remand from Supreme Court. The court reviewed its previous decision, accepting in part and rejecting in part the decision of a special master assigned to determine the fair market value of the stock of defendant corporation. The court affirmed its previous decision. Motion to alter or amend judgment, pursuant to Rule 59(e). The court held that the limitations of G.L. 1956 § 9-31-3 did not preclude the plaintiff from recovering against the town. In this case the court held that the town was engaged in an activity that a private person would likely carry out. The court considered plaintiff’s and defendant’s motions in limine. The court in this case found that the disputed evidence was prejudicial, confusing and would improperly influence the factfinder’s determination. For this reason the court denied defendant’s motion to admit and granted the plaintiff’s motion to preclude the evidence. Appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Education. The court upheld the decision of the Commissioner finding that the Town of West Warwick did not have an obligation to pay for the education of a student enrolled in a Warwick school. The court affirmed the decision finding that Warwick had waived its residency requirement. Action for declaratory and injunctive relief under G.L. 2956 § 9-30-1 et seq. and the R.I. Constitution. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing to seek the specific relief sought. Therefore the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. William L. Finn v. Stephen C. Finn, No. 99-0517 (September 28, 2000) Property case. The Court ruled that defendant, as a tenant in common, was required to pay half of the expenses along with the joint owner of the property. Petition for relief from real estate taxes pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 44-5-26. The court held in favor of respondents, finding that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing that the 1995 assessments exceeded the full and fair cash vale of the property. Cross motions for summary judgment. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion, finding that the defendant was obligated to indemnify the plaintiff for its losses incurred in the settlement of the underlying claim. Defendant’s motion was denied. Motion for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59. The court found that the jury award was excessive in relation to the injury sustained by the plaintiff. The court held that the award was the result of undue passion or prejudice. Therefore, the court held that unless the plaintiff remitted a portion of the award the court would order a new trial solely on the issue of damages. Cross motions for summary judgment. The court examined the undisputed facts and determined that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment. Thus, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his petition for declaratory judgment was denied. Defendant moved to confirm, and plaintiff moved to vacate and stay an arbitration award. The court affirmed the decision of the arbitrator, finding that the city was obligated to uphold the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Appeal from a finding of the Coastal Resources Management Council. The court found that the council’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious in excess of their statutory authority or unsupported by reliable evidence. Thus, the court upheld the council’s decision finding that a particular parcel of land constituted a public right of way to the shoreline. Appeal from decision of zoning board. The court affirmed the decision of the zoning board, finding that the decision to extend relief was not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Appeal from a decision of the Department of Environmental Management. The trial justice affirmed the decision of the hearing officer to revoke plaintiff’s septic system installer’s license, finding that that decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Appeal from a decision of Zoning Board of Review. The trial justice remands for determination by the board as to whether the doctrine of administrative finality applies. Motion to amend verified complaint and motion for joinder. The trial justice granted both motions as to one party, but denies motion for joinder as to second party, finding that second party has not alleged an injury in fact that would allow him standing in the action. Requests for preliminary injunctive relief. The trial justice denied plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief as to the non-competition agreement finding that enforcement serves to further no legitimate or substantial business interest of the plaintiffs. The trial justice denied plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief as to the non-disclosure agreement finding that plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of making out a prima facie case so as to establish the requisite showing of likelihood of success. The trial justice granted plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief as to the utilization by defendants of the know-how developed from plaintiff corporation’s confidential information, finding that maintenance of the status quo is a proper function of a preliminary injunction. State of Rhode Island v. Charles Fuller, No. 99-0311 (October 23, 2000) Motion to compel. The trial justice concludes that neither the Brady principles nor Rule 16 compel the State to disclose a summary of all prior occasions that a witness may have cooperated with State authorities. Appeal from a decision of Zoning Board of Review. The trial justice rejected the decision of the board to deny plaintiff’s request for permission to enclose a porch and move a set of outside chairs and a Bilco door in order to provide the office building with an additional two parking spaces and some storage area. The trial justice finds that the decision of the board, that modifications would result in a substantial intensification of a prior use, was clearly erroneous. Plaintiff’s motion for costs and attorneys’ fees and defendant’s cross-motions to vacate judgments. The trial justice finds that the plaintiff is entitled to the remedies provided by G.L. 1956 § 44-7-12(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The trial justice denies defendant’s motion to vacate judgment, rejecting defendant’s contention that judgment should be vacated because of the trial justice’s alleged errors, and finding that proffered newly discovered evidence was not what Rule 60(b) contemplates as material enough to probably change the outcome of the proceedings. Motion for approval of defendants’ certificate of compliance with contempt order and motion for approval of appropriate cover material. The trial justice finds that defendants are in substantial compliance with court orders, and approves defendants’ proposal for appropriate cover material. Marketing Design Source, Inc. vs. Pranda North America, Inc., No. 93-699 (November 2, 2000) Motion for new trial. The court denies defendant’s motion for a new trial. The court finds competent and credible evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. The court does not find that the damage award shocked the conscience of the court, was affected by passion or prejudice or emanated from a clearly erroneous basis. Bernadette Cicione v. Cafe Renaissance, Inc., No. 00-5219 (November 3, 2000) Motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The trial justice grants plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction finding that use of the same or substantially the same name for restaurants would be likely to cause confusion. The trial justice concludes that if injunctive relief were denied, plaintiff would lose the unique character and identity of her business. Appeal from decision of Zoning Board of Review. The trial justice rejects the decision of the board to uphold the zoning official’s order denying plaintiffs’ right to operate a methadone treatment facility on the subject property, finding that the decision was clearly erroneous. Marketing Design Source, Inc. vs. Pranda North America, Inc. No. 93-699 (November 20, 2000) Motion for new trial. The court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. The court finds competent and credible evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. The court does not find that the damage award shocked the conscience of the court, was affected by passion or prejudice or emanated from a clearly erroneous basis. Feijoo Barbosa Furniture, Inc. vs. Carlota Mendes, et al, No. 98-0362 (November 22, 2000) Motion for new trial. The trial justice denies defendant’s motion for a new trial finding that the jury verdict was not against the fair preponderance of the evidence. Motion for additur, motion for new trial, motion for sanctions, motion for taxation of costs, and motion for attorney’s fees. The trial justice grants plaintiff’s motion for additur, finding that the pain and suffering she experienced support an additur. The trial justice denies the plaintiff’s motion for new trial finding that the plaintiff failed to show that misconduct on the part of three defendant police officers disturbed the jurors, resulting in prejudice to the plaintiff. In denying this motion for new trial, the trial justice also finds that the plaintiff’s contention that defendants’ theory of the case constituted unfair surprise, and about witness testimony, are without merit. The court denies the request to impose sanctions under Rule 37(c) because the defendants’ refusal to admit was justified since the defendants had reasonable grounds to believe that they might prevail on the issues and there was other good reason for failure to admit. The court denies plaintiff’s claim for costs, as it applies to each of the prevailing party defendants. The request to recover as costs the amount paid for deposition transcripts is granted. The court also finds that the defendant is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees as a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, since the plaintiff’s claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, groundless or brought in bad faith.
Hathaway Street Management Corp. vs. George Gardiner D.B.A. Calart, No. 99-6630 (November 22, 2000) Appeal from judgment of District Court. The trial justice dismisses the appeal. The court finds that pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-12-10, the period for claiming the appeal lapsed, and the appeal is therefore untimely. Accordingly, the court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Appeal from decision of Zoning Board of Review. The trial justice affirms the board’s decision to grant dimensional relief, finding the decision supported by the reliable, substantial and probative evidence in the record. Motion for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court finds that the odors emanating from the subject property constitute a public nuisance, which in the absence of relief, will continue to unreasonably interfere with neighbors’ use and enjoyment of their premises. The court finds injunctive relief to be both necessary and appropriate. Decision on the pleadings. The court concludes that the plaintiffs have failed as a matter of law and fact to satisfy their burden of showing that the challenged regulations of the Department of Environmental Management are invalid or inapplicable. John Hauser v. Rosemarie Davis, No. 93-0295 (December 21, 2000) Motion to dismiss, or in the alternative motion for summary judgment. The defendants’ filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The motion was granted in part and denied in part with respect to claims arising out of a continuing trespass. The court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding that their conduct was justified in the exercise of an easement. The court denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity through application of the public duty doctrine. The court also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s lack of title at the time of its conduct. This is a case of first impression dealing with automobile liability insurers whose policies contain competing “other-insurance” clauses. At issue is how liability for plaintiff’s settlement should be apportioned between the insurance company of defendant driver and the insurance company of defendant vehicle owner. The Court determined that in order to give effect to the goals of compulsory liability insurance, the insurance company of defendant vehicle owner is liable for the first $25,000 of the settlement (the statutory minimum amount of liability coverage required by Rhode Island law), and the cost of the settlement in excess of $25, 000 is to be shared pro rata by the two insurers. This is an appeal of the city tax assessor’s determination of the fair market value of plaintiff’s property. Given the uniqueness of plaintiff’s property (Edgehill in Newport), the Court endorsed the evaluation that was based upon the income capitalization approach and rejected the evaluations that were based upon the sales comparison approach. This is an appeal from the zoning board’s denial of an application for a special use permit. The Court upheld the decision of the zoning board as it found that the board's decision was based upon substantial evidence in the record. Furthermore, the Court held that although the Court prefers that the zoning board include findings of facts and conclusions of law in a written decision, the zoning board is not required to make findings at the hearing stage. Debra Seddon et al v. Wickes, No. 97-154 (December 8, 2000) This is a motion for a new trial and/or additur. The trial justice denied the motion since plaintiffs did not meet the standard for overturning a jury verdict. Rather, the Court found that reasonable minds could differ as to what should be the outcome of the case; reasonable mind could differ as to the credibility of witnesses; and reasonable minds could differ as to the interpretation of evidence. This is an appeal from the Board of Regents’ order upholding the Commissioner of Education’s decision to order the General Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island to deduct monies from the plaintiff’s operations aid. The trial justice found that the withholding of funds by the Commissioner of Education was warranted under G.L. 1956 § 16-5-30 since plaintiff’s failure to arrange for an individualized education program (IEP) for the disabled student constituted a “violation or neglect of law or * * * violation or neglect of rules and regulations” under G.L. 1956 § 16-5-30. Additionally, the trial justice found that full-time nursing services rendered to the disabled student while the student was being weaned off a ventilator constituted “related services” under the Individual with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”). This case deals with the intestate inheritance rights of persons adopted as adults. The trial justice found that there are no distinctions between the rights of persons adopted as minors and the rights of persons adopted over the age of 18. Thus, an individual adopted as an adult is on equal footing with a biological child for purposes of inheritance. Larry & Patricia Carter v. Marilyn Nassif, No. 98-276 (December 8, 2000) This non jury trial involved the interpretation of the parties’ obligations pursuant to a purchase and sales agreement which was negotiated by defendant and signed by both defendant and her husband. Despite the death of defendant’s husband, the trial justice found that the agreement was enforceable since the language of the agreement clearly stated that the death of a party did not invalidate the agreement and since the defendant was a party and not a mere ineffectual signatory. Damages were awarded to plaintiffs based upon the lower property price plaintiffs received from a subsequent buyer, increased commissions paid to a broker, and the carrying costs of the property. William Raposa v. Kyle A. Welchman, No. 98-245 (December 4, 2000) In this non jury trial, plaintiff brought an action against defendant, seeking to recover monies owed to him pursuant to a purchase and sale agreement for plaintiff's property; Defendant counter-claimed, alleging fraud and misrepresentation by Plaintiff. The trial justice found that Plaintiff misrepresented to Defendant that the property was suitable for a three bedroom home and thus awarded damages to Defendant after setting off the amount owed to Plaintiff for the property. The court noted that since this is a contract based action, so long as the inducing misrepresentation is material, it is irrelevant whether the misrepresentation was fraudulent, negligent, or innocent. |
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